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Abstract 
 
This article evaluates EU policies on public services – particularly public network 
services - from the citizens´ point of view. It is first argued that citizens´ perceptions 
about these services are important because they are essential for quality of life, but 
also because they exhibit economic characteristics such as asymmetrical 
information, adverse selection and positive externalities. Changing EU policy on 
public services is synthesised and classified into two main phases in section two. 
Citizen satisfaction with public services as revealed through surveys from 1997 to 
2007 is explored in the third section. In the discussion, the prospects for EU policy 
on public services are considered and, it is argued that, from the perspectives of 
subsidiarity and proportionality, policy towards strengthening the common market is 
being increasingly uploaded to the supranational level in the form of directives, whilst 
cohesion and redistribution policies are being downloaded to the national level or 
dealt with at the supranational level by “soft” instruments. 
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Evaluating EU policies on public services: A citizens´ perspective 
 
 
I. Why do we need to know what the citizens think about public services? 
 
Basic public network services - water, energy, transportation and communication - 
provide essential services for life. Water is the most fundamental of these services 
and, though the majority of water consumed by people and organizations is not for 
drinking purposes, the availability of drinking water of a certain quality for all has 
been recognised in the UN Millennium Goals. In a similar way, though advanced 
telecommunication services may not be fundamental, basic services are considered 
essential for economic, social and human development (ITU, 2006). A similar logic 
applies to energy and transportation. In addition to these fundamental justifications 
as to why citizens´ opinions about public services are important, there are more 
specific ones, since public network services exhibit certain economic characteristics 
which render them different to most other sectors. In synthesis, these characteristics 
include: natural monopoly, resulting from the high capital intensive and long-term 
investment required to build a network; dynamic economies of scale and scope; 
network externalities, which are strategic for economic and social development of all 
other activities; public service obligations and information asymmetries. The rest of 
this section briefly analyses why characteristics make citizens´ views important. 
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Although technological change has vastly reduced the requirements of high capital 
intensive costs for new entrants in some segments of the public network services, 
such as satellite, mobile telephony and cable technologies in the 
telecommunications sector, in the twenty-first century, important parts of public 
network services still exhibit non-competitive or monopolistic characteristics, such as 
intra-regional rail infrastructure, electricity transmission and distribution over high 
voltage networks, and water and sewerage. Economies of scale and scope still exist 
across some parts of the networks. High fixed sunk costs associated with building 
the network continue to deter new entrants, reducing potential for competition, whilst 
economies of scope allow the largest firms to offer more services. Despite the 
confidence placed in programmes of privatization, liberalization and unbundling to 
reform the network services during the 1990s, it is being increasingly recognised that 
there are limits to these policies because of the economic characteristics of these 
sectors. In practice, competition can often be introduced into parts of the network, 
but not across the whole network, as shown in Table 1. For instance, in the postal 
service sector, competition is possible in the delivery of urgent mail or in densely 
populated areas, but delivery of non-urgent mail in rural areas needs protecting by 
exclusive right, or else cream-skimming occurs whilst the periphery is neglected, as 
demonstrated in the Corbeau case.  
 4 
 
Table 1. 
  Non-competitive activities Potentially competitive activities 
Telecommunications 
Local loop services  Temination of call on other 
networks 
Long-distance; Mobile; Value-added services. 
Local loop to high-density areas or 
broadband-cable-TV 
Postal  
Door-to-door delivery of non-urgent mail in 
lower density residential areas 
Transportation of mail; Delivery of urgent mail 
or packages to high volume business in high 
density areas 
Electricity High-voltage transmission. Local distribution 
Electricity generation. Retailing or marketing. 
Trading activities 
Gas 
High-pressure transmission of gas. Local 
distribution in low density areas. 
Gas production, storage, retailing and 
marketing 
Air Transport Access to runways, take-off  landing slots Aircraft Maintenance Catering 
Railways Track and signalling infrastructure Operation  Maintenance 
Maritime  Port facilities  Pilot services, port services 
 Source: OECD (2002) Restructuring Public Utilities for Competition 
 
Externalities are strong in network services because all subscribers or users are 
linked to most, or all, of the network: put simply, the more network users there are, 
the more the users can benefit from the larger network with a greater potential for 
communication and shared information. For historical reasons, universal public 
service obligations have been established in most network services and guaranteed 
by the privilege of exclusive rights for an enterprise, whether public or private, 
although these incumbents are increasingly on the defensive as EU competition 
policy is gradually extended more deeply to the network services. In this regard, it is 
important to know what citizens - as opposed to consumers - think about these 
services. Some citizens may be excluded from receiving these services because 
they live in the periphery or isolated areas (rural or mountainous zones, islands or 
enclaves) where network investment is not profitable, or because they cannot afford 
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them. Even if citizens can afford these services, they may not want them, but their 
provision affects them indirectly through externalities via their neighbours´ access to 
these services. When considering questions such as affordability and accessibility of 
public services, distortion is introduced if only consumers´ views are included, 
excluding citizens or “non-consumers”. However, this is what sometimes happened 
in some EU surveys, as is shown in section three.  
 
Finally, public service networks exhibit problems of asymmetric information (adverse 
selection and moral hazard) between the regulatory authority and the firm, between 
firms in the same or different industry segments, as well as between citizens and the 
firm. Most citizens cannot properly know the quality of water they drink, nor can they 
appreciate the quality of electricity or gas that cooks their food or warms their home, 
even after repeated consumption. In this situation, the provider may decrease quality 
while maintaining prices (moral hazard), whilst consumers struggle to choose the 
superior provider (adverse selection) assuming there is competition. Hirschman’s 
“exit-voice-loyalty” framework is of use here, since, generally speaking, “exit” for 
citizens is difficult (Hirschman, 1970; Costas, 2006). In the case there is 
dissatisfaction with a particular service, this service cannot be returned to the 
provider, whilst any unknown effects could have an irreversible effect on the 
consumer (water, energy or transport). Nor can the citizen necessarily opt for 
another service provider either because there is no competition, or because the 
perceived costs of switching provider are high, such as internet or electricity. In 
these cases, the need for “voice” is particularly important. Citizens´ opinions about 
public network service provision are important sources of information for other 
citizens, firms (competitors and new entrants) and regulators. Comparative, dynamic 
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knowledge (observation and analysis) about the evolution of citizens´ opinions on 
the provision of public network services disaggregated into sectors and countries 
provides a useful basis for designing and evaluating public policy reform in these 
sectors. Citizens´ opinions on public services in the EU-15 and the EU-25 between 
1997 and 2007 are examined in section three. Before that, a brief synthesis of the 
evolution of EU policy on public services is included in section two.  
 
2. EU policy on public network services 
 
Hirschman (1982) enquired as to the reasons for oscillations between intense 
interest in public issues and concentration on private goals: the evolution of EU 
policy on public services is an interesting case of changing public-private 
involvement. EU policy on public network services can be envisaged as a triangle, 
with the State, Market and Citizens/Consumers at the corners. EU policy always 
includes all three, but in different proportions. In general terms, from the post-war 
period, the State was entrusted to supply, top-down, public services to citizens, 
usually via public monopolies and public service obligations. This changed from the 
1970s, when private ownership was deemed preferable to public ownership for 
public service supply. The most extreme proponents argued that private monopoly 
was superior to a public one, due to the assumed superior benefits private 
management would entail (Megginson and Netter, 2001), though privatization was 
often accompanied by new State regulation (Majone, 1996). From the late 1990s, 
there was increased recognition of the limits of privatization, liberalization and 
unbundling in the public services. 
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Generally speaking, EU policy on public services can be divided into two main 
phases. The first phase, from the Treaty of Rome (1957) to the beginning of the 
1980s, is the “blind eye” period, since this was characterised by EC competence in 
the field, but neglect in practice. The Treaty of Rome aimed to create a single 
common market characterised by regional competition policy, where goods, 
services, persons and capital could freely circulate. In addition, the treaty made 
reference to Services of General Economic Interest (SGEI), stating that these 
services should be subject to competition as long as that did not deter their provision 
of these services. In practice, however, it was left to Member States to gradually 
phase out regulation and interventionist policies and, in the quest for competitive 
markets at a supranational level, a blind eye was turned to national government 
subsidisation or preferential treatment of public and private enterprises providing 
public services, as this could have been perceived as interference, and potentially 
highly conflictive with Member States. Historically, in Europe, and indeed, most other 
economies around the world, public intervention in many forms was commonplace 
and, until the 1970s, only the most extreme of debates would have argued that 
public intervention was incompatible with the functioning of the market. Most 
prominent economists analysed and dealt with the problem of competition in markets 
operating in networks in terms of the public interest. The control of natural 
monopolies had constituted, within the analysis of general equilibrium, the exception 
to the rule about perfect competition and the traditional justification for public 
intervention. At the same time, public services had played an important role in the 
historical evolution and institutional building of EU Member States, representing a 
different model than that found in the United States (Galambos, 2000). Though there 
were some important differences in the public service regimes across Member 
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States, there were also many common features in terms of raison d´ etre, 
organization, ownership, regulation and development.  
 
A change in EU policy occurred during the 1970s, starting in 1974, when the 
European Court of Justice clarified that Article 86, which dealt with providers of SGEI 
and competition law, was now understood to mean that the burden of proof would 
fall to the provider: in other words, it would have to be proved that exposure to 
competition damaged SGEI provision. This became known as the “rule exemption 
clause”, according to which competition law is the “default” and the general interest 
the exemption once proven (Damjanovic, 2007). This change opened the door in 
legal terms for the second phase of EU policy on public services, “activation”. 
Change in EU policy was prompted by economic and financial crises, accompanied 
by a shift in economic policy objectives from Keynesian “interventionism to sustain 
economic activity” to one based on faith in the market-oriented reforms and private 
ownership. In this period, the previously unresolved contradictions at the heart of 
policy on public services were increasingly exposed to probing, and, finally, dramatic 
reform. Deepened integration, combined with the global shift towards more “neo-
conservative” economic policies, increasingly forced State intervention – in general 
and in enterprises providing public services – onto the defensive. In the 
telecommunications sector, most European countries transformed the direct 
regulation by bureaucratic public operators (typically Post, Telecommunications and 
Telegraph, PTT) of State-owned enterprises (such as BT, Deutsche Telekom or 
France Télécom) during the 1980s, whilst the EC introduced modest reforms to open 
up certain segments of national markets (terminal equipment in 1988, public 
procurement in 1990). In the 1990s a regulatory framework for liberalization and 
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independent sector regulation was introduced (EC 96/19/EC). Accordingly, Member 
States set up independent regulatory agencies and agreed to liberalise the sector by 
1998 (in Ireland and Portugal the date was 2000, and in Greece in 2001).1 Whilst 
privatization was not an EC competence, most governments also fully or partially 
privatised the sector too.  
 
Internal market energy liberalization developed in parallel with that of the telecoms 
industry, the first measures taking place in 1996 (92/EC) and 1998, but was dogged 
by delays and reforms (Directives 2003/54/EC and 2003/55/EC). Privatization in the 
energy sector proceeded liberalization in many regions, such as England, Wales, 
Austria, Belgium, Germany and Spain, whilst the rest of the EU-15 started to 
privatise in the 1990s (Clifton, Comín & Díaz-Fuentes 2003). France generally 
resisted both privatization and liberalisation (Cenoud & Varone 2002). Over one 
decade later, a study of the effects of privatization and liberalization of the three 
largest electricity markets in the EU revealed that prices were lowest in France, 
precisely where less reform had occurred (Florio 2007). 
 
EU transport policy is the oldest, the most heterogeneous (in terms of ownership and 
technology) and perhaps the most complex of all policy on public network services. 
A common transport policy was included in the Treaty of Rome, as it was recognised 
that Europe’s transport system needed to be integrated in order to facilitate market 
integration, so policy was less of a “blind eye” than in other sectors. Despite this, 
there were multiple delays and failures in implementing a common transport system 
as argued by Pelkmans (2006). EU transport policy needs evaluating by sub-sector 
due to its heterogeneity, which is beyond the aim of this paper, but a general 
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conclusion is that there is still significant public intervention in these sub-sectors and 
no common European model as yet.  
 
Postal services reform is much more recent: liberalization commenced with the 
reform of the PPT and was pushed further by the first and second postal directives 
(97/67/EC and 2002/39/EC). Whilst liberalization has been resisted in some Member 
States, a recent development is the successful internationalisation of firms such as 
DHL (UNCTAD, 2004). 
 
The speed and depth of these policy reforms alarmed certain European politicians 
and social partners from the 1990s. The basic concern was that citizens needed 
some kind of guarantee to ensure their rights to satisfactory public service provision 
amid profound reforms. The European Centre of Enterprises with Public 
Participation and of Enterprises of General Economic Interest (CEEP), and the 
European Trade Union Confederation (ETUC), were particularly active, and were 
commissioned by the French and Belgian presidencies to draft a Charter for 
Services of General Interest (SGI) as a basis for a Framework Directive (CEEP and 
ETUC, 2000). These groups were not against the market reforms per se, rather, they 
sought to reduce uncertainties about public service provision. Public services, 
previously provided mostly by State ownership, had been subject to regulation 
enshrined in a Constitution or national legal system. Citizens had a “voice” via the 
universal right to vote nationally and locally. Under privatised ownership and market-
driven rules, it was feared that commercial interests would be pursued over and 
above the public interest, which could negatively affect public service obligations, 
universal service, quality, price and continuity of supply. These concerns grew when 
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Foreign Direct Investment, in particular Mergers and Acquisitions, took off in the 
public network services from the end of the 1990s. Liberalization created new 
business opportunities to expand within the EU and beyond, whilst privatization 
generated new financial opportunities for Mergers and Acquisitions in these 
services, where size mattered, given persisting economies of scale and monopolistic 
competition. Newbery (2007) argues that one of the reasons for the “merger wave” 
in recent years is that since energy demand and thus organic growth is increasingly 
only slowly, electricity utility managers either have the option of returning profits to 
shareholders or spending them on acquisitions, the latter being more in their 
interest. This conflict of interests was predicted by the “principal agent” dilemma 
whereby, in the face of Mergers and Acquisitions, managers, shareholders, workers 
and citizens can all have different interests. This conflict was one of the justifications 
for introducing golden shares and designating the sectors of “strategic” interest. 
 
Recently, public network service providers, bound by Nation States for the bulk of 
the twentieth century, have transformed into some of the world’s leading 
Transnational Corporations, led in particular by EU-based firms: Deutsche Telekom, 
Électricité de France, Vodafone, DHL, Suez, Telefonica and Enel (Clifton, Comín 
and Díaz-Fuentes 2007). These services, once delivered and guaranteed by the 
State, can now be delivered by State-regulated Transnational Corporations, whether 
private, State-owned, foreign or domestic. Public network services, understood for 
most of the twentieth century as a domestic instrument of the Nation State, have 
become an increasingly important part of international trade and a key issue in 
international economic policy. An important turning point was the incorporation of 
services into the establishment of the World Trade Organization in 1994. Raza 
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(2007), following Krugman (1997) argues that, although EU trade commissioners 
support free trade in theory, in practice, they are inspired by mercantilism. In 
contemporary trade policy, the State, which must safeguard the interests of a 
national economy and its principal stakeholders, privileges nationally-based firms at 
home in order to facilitate their expansion abroad. This can be understood as a neo-
mercantilism, in that the objective of trade policy is to achieve a trade surplus (public 
service exports are promoted whilst imports are blocked). Indeed, “national 
champion” policies at home have been one of the key developments in promoting 
the expansion of public network services abroad (Clifton, Comín and Díaz-Fuentes 
2007, UNCTAD 2008). 
 
In parallel to the increasing involvement of public service networks to liberalization, 
privatization and internationalization, there was a notable shift towards their 
“commodification”, in policy reform and in the way in which public services were 
conceived. As part of this change, systematic efforts to survey and collect data on 
citizen and consumer satisfaction began in this period. During the 1990s, a decision 
was taken within the EU to replace the house-hold term “public service” in official 
discourse with SGI. The Commission (EC 1996:1) argued that this was necessary in 
order to avoid the ambiguity of the term “public service”. This ambiguity, it was 
argued, lay in the fact that two things were generally understood: public ownership 
and a service for the public. Claiming it must adopt a neutral stance on ownership, 
the EC argued that SGI was a more accurate term as it expressed the service was 
for the “general interest” without suggesting who owned it. It will be remembered that 
SGEI figures in the original treaty, but SGI does not. Definitions of these two terms 
were fore-grounded in the Green and White Papers on SGI (EC 2003d and 2004a). 
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Confusingly, the term SGI was used to refer to two different things: it referred to non-
economic services, and was also used as a “blanket” term to refer to both SGI and 
SGEI. Although the categories SGI (“non-market”) and SGEI (“market”) are stable 
theoretically, the way in which sectors are classified into “market” and “non-market” 
sectors is fluid and subject to change. Moreover, Member States may have different 
ideas about how to classify services. While it may be less controversial to justify the 
classification of justice and security as SGI, it is more difficult to agree on social 
protection and education classification. Those services not falling in the SGI 
category are understood as “market” services upon which specific public obligations 
are placed and subject to competition when this does not negatively affect service 
provision. Writ large, this fluidity has important consequences at the international 
level since the GATS rules are applicable to privately-owned services that are no 
longer deemed appropriate for protection from the competition at the national level 
(Raza, 2007).  
 
Though, ostensibly, the terms SGI and SGEI were introduced in order to present EU 
policies more clearly, after more than a decade of reform, most citizens simply do 
not understand this terminology. Blame lies with the EU, as the terminology is 
confusing, and has not been communicated well. The problems are greater in 
countries such as Germany and the UK, which do not have similar legal equivalents 
at the national level, making their adoption more challenging. In some of the newer 
Member States such as Poland, the Czech Republic, Estonia and Slovenia, these 
legal categories do not even exist (Mangenot, 2005). Furthermore, SGI 
documentation is usually not translated into the new Eastern European languages 
leading to semantic confusion. 
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As part of this “activation” phase, systematic attention was paid, from the mid 1990s, 
to the opinion of citizens and consumers about public service provision. Two main 
influences were at play here: firstly the New Public Management school, secondly, 
continental legal traditions (Clifton, Comín and Díaz-Fuentes 2005; Prosser, 2005). 
The next section critically analyses the major surveys on citizen and consumer 
satisfaction published between 1997 and 2007.  
 
3. Evaluating satisfaction with public services: consumers, citizens and “non-
consumers” 
 
From the mid 1990s, the EC intensified efforts to produce systematically data on 
citizen satisfaction with public services, as well as on measuring public service 
performance. In regard to the latter, a horizontal, “evolutionary” method of evaluation 
was adopted in 2002 and applied from 2004. This methodology was developed by 
the DG Internal Market in consultation with the CEEP and the Initiative for Public 
Service Utilities in Europe. Topics are selected (such as productivity, cohesion, 
transposition of directives, or access) that are common concerns to all the network 
services, and considered on a cross-sectoral, cross-national basis. Methodology 
combines economic analysis of market performance, public policy objectives and 
developments and public service obligations, whilst it also takes into consideration 
the results from the surveys on citizen satisfaction. Horizontal evaluations have been 
used to complement sectoral evaluations of air and railway transportation, local and 
regional public transport, electricity, gas, postal services, telecommunications and, 
from 2006, internet and bank services. Among the main challenges faced by the 
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evaluators are that there are gaps in statistical information about service quality 
indicators across the EU; there is limited experience in the horizontal evaluation of 
these services; and cross-country evaluation is difficult since policy objectives vary 
according to the Member State. Moreover, public policy objectives can be achieved 
via different means (access may be ensured using electricity or gas for instance). 
Horizontal evaluations are not, therefore, full evaluations in the traditional sense, and 
they are not used to produce recommendations for specific sectors. It is left up to 
Member States to evaluate public service performance in the last instance, though 
comparative studies act as a pressure for underperforming countries to improve.2 In 
addition, the evaluations serve as a basis when working with regulators and network 
operators to develop and foster common criteria. In some cases, such as postal 
services, it has been possible to develop common service quality criteria using 
European standardisation bodies, but this is an exception to the rule.3  
 
In regard to evaluating citizen satisfaction with public services, the methodology 
used is similar to that which has been used by the EC to monitor public opinion from 
1973 (Eurobarometer). Standard survey techniques, in addition to “flash” surveys 
(conducted by telephone for rapid publication), and focus group techniques are 
used. Citizen satisfaction with public services has been gauged in a series of 
Eurobarometer surveys published from 1997 to 2007. Here, the six main surveys on 
SGI satisfaction are considered. The first in-depth survey on customer satisfaction 
with public services was the Eurobarometer Opinion Poll 47.1 (EC, 1997). For 
methodological reasons, results from the 1997 survey cannot easily be compared to 
the surveys from 2000.4 In 2000, the EC took great strides to use similar 
methodological approaches so as to make data on satisfaction comparable over 
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time. Eurobarometer 53 (EC, 2000a) and 58 (EC, 2002a) are in-depth surveys 
dedicated to the analysis of customer – not citizen - satisfaction with SGI in the EU-
15. Another survey conducted in the Candidate Country European Barometer (EC 
2003) uses similar methodologies and is thus directly comparable. In 2004, the EC 
commissioned Eurobarometer 219 (EC, 2005a) for the EU-25, which is also 
comparable to the SGI surveys from 2000. Eurobarometer 260 (EC, 2007a) deals 
with consumer attitudes towards SGI including new services such as internet and 
banking during the year 2006. EC 2000a, 2002a, 2003a and 2005a measure 
customer satisfaction with SGI using access, price, quality, information, and other 
contract indicators. Global results are broken down into sectors: electricity, gas, 
water, fixed telephony, mobile telephony, postal services, urban transport and 
railways, EC 2007a covers these sectors plus internet and banking.  
 
In what follows, the surveys will be analysed in order to extract information about 
citizens and consumers views on public services. Data revealing information about 
consumers´ and citizens´ satisfaction with SGI in general is analysed for the EU-15 
(using EC, 1997; EC, 2000a and EC, 2002a), the EU-10 (EC, 2003a) and the EU-25 
(EC 2005a and 2007a). Attention will be paid to methodological changes, and efforts 
will be made to compare over time the results, by country, sector and by issue 
surveyed, contrasting where necessary, the “official” interpretation with an 
independent analysis.  
 
The first survey (EC, 1997), entitled “Consumers´ Europe: citizens face competition 
of public service monopolies”, was designed to understand how citizens perceived 
public service reform, particularly liberalization, their recent experiences with service 
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quality and price, satisfaction with public services, and their expectations about 
minimum service. Services were included in this survey were quite broad, including 
gas, water, fixed telephony, postal services, air transport, urban transport, inter-
urban coach transport, rail transportation and television access, in addition to non-
network services, such as justice, health, ambulances, road maintenance and so 
forth. Some 61% of European citizens stated they were aware of the opening of 
public services to competition, while 70% of them considered it a good thing in 
regard both to service quality and price. However, the vast majority claimed they had 
not yet witnessed improvements in price (85%) quality (76%), choice (73%) or 
customers´ interest protection (83%). Price reductions in the telecommunications 
sector were slightly better than average, since “only” 73% believed they had not 
enjoyed cuts yet. The UK did slightly better than the rest of the EU in terms of price 
reductions in telecommunications, electricity and gas distribution, though results for 
water, railways and postal services were very similar to the EU average. 
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Table 2. Perception of Quality of SGI: EU15 average of satisfaction and country differentials (1997). 
 EU GR I P E B F UK D IR S A LU NL FI DK 
Electricity distribution 81 -28  -13  -17  -7  -1  1  4  2  15  13  14  7  16  15  16  
Gas distribution 66 dk  -6  -22  -3  -3  3  10  9  -14   dk 4  5  30  dk 4  
Water distribution 63 -24  -13  -15  -2  1  -11  -6  13  1  28  23  17  28  28  27  
Fixed Telephony  74 -40  -9  -16  -4  -4  6  7  2  12  17  4  10  6  20  5  
Postal services 53 -6  -32  -1  -6  2  7  22  -3  28  -2  9  26  29  5  30  
Public urban transport 44 -19  -21  -16  9  -2  1  -3  7  7  17  16  27  11  25  28  
Intercity railway 41 -6  -25  -6  6  6  1  -8  9  16  1  17  26  17  33  37  
 60 -21  -17  -13  -1  -0  1  4  6  9  11  12  17  20  20  21  
Source: Elaborated by the authors using Eurobarometer 47.1 (1997) data. 
 
In regard to perception of service quality, EU citizens revealed strikingly different 
results depending on the sector: whilst 81% of EU citizens thought electricity 
distribution was of a good quality, only between 41% and 44% thought the same 
about public transport and railways respectively, as shown in Table 2. Within each 
sector, country responses differed: in the case of electricity distribution, percentages 
ranging from 53% in Greece to 97% in Denmark thought the service was 
satisfactory. When interpreting results, there may be a large percentage of “don’t 
knows” (dk), particularly in certain countries for particular sectors (such as gas in 
Greece, Finland and Sweden where availability was limited).  
 
Another clear trend was country differences. Countries fell into one of three 
categories: those with citizens having below-average satisfaction with public 
services (Greece, Italy, Portugal and Spain); those with above-average satisfaction 
(Austria, Luxemburg, Netherlands, Finland and Denmark); and those with close-to-
average satisfaction (Belgium, France, the United Kingdom, Germany, Ireland and 
Sweden). Despite an early start and prolonged privatisation process, and the 
liberalisation of many public utility monopolies, UK citizens were not, on average, 
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relatively more satisfied with their public services in general than in the rest of the 
EU.  Indeed, in the UK, most satisfaction was shown for postal services, which, in 
1997, was still a public corporation subject to public service reform, whilst the lowest 
quality perceptions were perceived for railways and urban transport, where 
liberalisation was relatively advanced. In sum, this survey noted a paradox: 
European citizens had high hopes about the benefits that the liberalization of public 
services would bring, but most of them had not as yet experienced the benefits in 
terms of price, quality and choice.  
 
The next survey (EC, 2000a) avoided the dilemma of using “citizen” or “consumer” in 
 EU-15 EU-10 NM 
 Quality = Q Price = P 
Information 
= I 
Contracts = 
C Overall = O Q P I C O 
 2000 2002 2000 2002 2000 2002 2000 2002 2000 2002  2003 
Electricity  92 91 56 55 75 73 68 68 73 72 95 44 82 67 72 
Gas  87 86 56 55 71 69 65 65 70 69 91 49 81 67 72 
Water  89 89 55 56 72 72 67 66 71 71 90 51 82 68 73 
Fixed Telephony  91 90 50 51 76 75 63 64 70 70 84 29 75 51 60 
Mobile Telephony 81 84 40 44 64 67 55 59 60 64 76 35 66 53 58 
Postal services 80 82 67 68 79 78 70 70 74 75 87 60 88 73 77 
Urban transport 66 66 49 47 70 68 59 57 61 60 70 48 77 61 64 
Intercity railway 61 59 41 38 66 62 55 51 56 53 58 38 70 54 55 
Correlation index  Quality Price Information      Q P I   
Price = P 0,44 0,59             0,35       
Information = I 0,51 0,69 0,88 0,89        0,69 0,81     
Contracts = C 0,66 0,84 0,95 0,93 0,88 0,90     0,62 0,94 0,91   
 
Eurobarometer 53 2000 (conducted 5 April - 27th May 2000) Survey carried out at the Request of the EC Director 
General Health and Consumer Protection 
Eurobarometer 58 2002 Consumers and General Interest Services The European Opinion Research Group  Survey 
carried out at the Request of the EC Director General Health and Consumer Protection 
CCEB Candidate Countries Eurobarometer 2003.3 (Fieldwork June-July 2003) DG Health and Consumer Protection 
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its title, calling itself “The People of Europe and Services of General Interest”. In 
practice, EC (2000a) and EC (2002a) deal only with consumers. Respondents who 
declared that certain questions did not concern them (“not applicable”) were 
screened a posteriori. These citizens were “non-consumers” of services. Data on 
satisfaction was thus recalculated on that basis. This survey measured consumer 
satisfaction with access, prices, quality, information, contracts and complaint 
handling for SGI. Since the methodology was identical, comparative analysis of 
consumer satisfaction could be derived.   
Table 3. Consumer satisfaction with SGI: EU15 average opinion on Quality, Price, Information, Contracts 
and Overall in 2000 and 2002 and EU 10 new members in 2003 
 
 
Comparing overall consumer satisfaction with SGI in 2000 and 2002 in the EU-15 
(calculated using the four indicators quality; price; information provided and 
contracts), a clear sectoral ranking emerges. Consumers were most satisfied with 
postal services (75% in 2002), though electricity, water, fixed telephones and gas 
distribution all scored highly in both surveys (above 69%). Of these four “high 
performing” sectors, average consumer satisfaction with quality, price, information 
nor contracts were stable between 2000 and 2002, as shown in Table 3. This 
ranking of satisfaction is similar to that of EC 1997 (bearing in mind the 1997 option 
´neither good nor bad´ is not included in EC 2000a and EC 2002a). “Lower 
performing” sectors were urban and rail transportation and mobile telephony, but 
with some important differences. Firstly, satisfaction with intercity rail services trailed 
far behind the other sectors, with just 53% of customers expressing overall 
satisfaction, but this represented a drop from 56% in EC 2000a. Urban transport 
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faired less badly, with overall satisfaction rates falling from 61% to 60% in the same 
period. Overall satisfaction with mobile telephony, mostly provided by private 
operators, and not dealt with in EC 1997, increased in EC 2002a to 64% from 60% 
in EC 2000a. The reasons for this lower overall satisfaction rate are clear: 
consumers had lower satisfaction rates with price, information provided and 
contracts. The 2000 and 2002 polls are not only homogenous in methodology, 
permitting coherent sectoral and country comparisons, they also show consistent 
results about customers´ opinions about different SGI as revealed in the matrix of 
correlation between criteria (quality, price, information and contracts). This indicator 
was most significant between price, contracts and information, and between 
information and contracts, suggesting consumer concern about their rights.  
 
In the face of enlargement, the survey “Consumers´ opinions on SGI” (EC 2003a) 
was published on consumer satisfaction in the ten candidate countries. This found 
that overall satisfaction rates with SGI were very similar in acceding countries. 
Satisfaction with postal services, electricity, water, gas, urban transport and railways 
were rated somewhat higher than in EU-15, whilst there was less satisfaction with 
fixed and mobile telephony (EC 2003a). The main source of dissatisfaction by 
consumers from the candidate countries was the perception of high prices.  
 
The most recent surveys on satisfaction with SGI are EC 2005a and EC 2007a. 
These surveys, called simply “Services of General Interest” deal with the same 
sectors as the surveys from 2000, whilst they also include internet and banking. 
There is an interesting change in the methodological approach in these recent 
surveys. Whilst EC 2000a and EC 2002a screened out non-consuming citizens from 
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the analysis, EC 2005a and 2007a identify SGI consumers and non-consumers at 
the outset. Questions of access are stressed for consumers and non-consumers, 
and the latter were surveyed further on issues such as accessibility, affordability-
price, quality, consumer rights protection and consumer relations. Non-consumers 
who nonetheless potentially had SGI provision were in particular asked about 
affordability and lack of knowledge. In addition, for the first time, additional socio-
economic variables of respondents were considered, including gender, age, 
education, household composition and “subjective” urbanisation. Another significant 
change is that these recent surveys seek to better understand the use of SGI. EC 
2005a and 2007a focus on five main areas of “consumer satisfaction”: access; use 
of SGI; how much they use; affordability; quality and consumer relations. Three 
aspects most suitable for comparison with EC 2000a, 2002a and 2003a are access, 
affordability and consumer relations (customer service, handling of complaints, 
consumer protection).  
Table 4. Consumer satisfaction with SGI: EU-25 average opinion on Access, Complaints and Affordability 
(users and non-users) in 2004 and 2006 
  Access Affordability 
Protection-
Complaint 
 2000 2002 2004 2006 2004 2006 2006* 2004 2006 
Electricity  91 88 90 93 64 66 50 56 49 
Gas  74 67 70 72 65 65 40 55 46 
Water  90 85 89 93 70 75 51 53 51 
Fixed Telephony  90 90 88 91 67 76 43 51 52 
Mobile Telephony 69 75 79 85 68 76 37 56 56 
Postal services 90 86 87 93 81 87 65 44 53 
Urban transport 75 68 71 80 68 78 54 39 53 
Intercity railway 70 61 64 73 63 74 49 43 53 
Note = 2006 Non-Users opinion on Affordability affordability of particular SGI 
Source: Elaborated by authors based on Eurobarometer 219 – “Consumers' opinions on services of 
general interest" (2005) conducted in 2004) and Eurobarometer 260 (2007) conducted in 2006. 
Eurobarometer 2000, 2002 and 2004. 
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It is interesting to contrast the official interpretation of survey findings with an 
independent analysis. In terms of SGI access, the latest survey is upbeat: “The 
results show how widely spread access is to a number of services ranging from the 
routine (water and electricity) to new technologies (mobile phone and internet) and 
services such as banking and transport….. it can be noted that at an EU level, 
access has not become more difficult in any sector…” (EC 2007b: 5). This optimistic 
scenario is largely derived from the fact that EC 2007b was compared with EC 
2005b. If, however, access to SGI is considered over the longer term, as in Table 4, 
it can be seen that SGI access has not actually improved so significantly between 
2000 and 2006. There was an improvement in access between 2004 and 2006, but 
only after a general decline in SGI access between 2000 and 2004. Mobile 
telephony is the exception; as a new technology, access grew from a lower access 
level from 2000. Breaking down SGI access by socio-economic group, differences in 
access to SGI becomes clearer. Access to mobile phones for the over 55s was 25 
points lower than the average, 9 points less for those in rural areas and 18 points 
lower for people living alone. For gas, access to the over 55s was 5 points down and 
rural villages 11 points down. In the case of urban transport, over 55s were 12 points 
down for access and 26 points lower for rural villages (EC 2007b). Despite these 
inequalities highlighted, little is said explicitly about their significance, for instance, 
what is an “acceptable” level of SGI (in)access. This leaves no clear target for EU 
policy on public services.  
 
Satisfaction with affordability is the next category whose evolution can be assessed. 
Again, EC 2007b is upbeat, asserting that, according to users’ views, most services 
have become more affordable. This assertion is questionable. A significant 
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proportion of consumers consider that the prices of some of the basic SGI are either 
not affordable or excessive (31% for electricity and 33% for gas). In addition, there is 
an important proportion of citizens who are excluded from SGI because they are 
unable to pay. Among mobile phone users, 76% claim the service is affordable, as 
shown in Table 4. However, of the “non-consumers”, 73% think this service is 
excessive or unaffordable. Some 40% of non-consumers of electricity and fixed 
telephony find the services excessive or unaffordable. For internet users, 80% 
consider the service affordable, while for non-users only 38%.  
 
The third category is consumer relations (including a growing number of issues, 
such as complaints handling and consumer protection). The EC considers consumer 
protection as critical, especially when there is monopoly provision. According to EC 
2005b and 2007b, “a majority of consumers consider their interest to be well 
protected”. Factually, this is true, since around 50% of consumers are satisfied. 
Satisfaction with consumer relations has, however, worsened over the last two years 
and from 2000 to 2006 in the cases of electricity, gas and water. Again, it is left 
unclear as to what is an “acceptable” level of dissatisfaction with consumer relations.  
 
In sum, between 1997 and 2007, surveys on citizen or consumer satisfaction with 
SGI have undergone shifts in terms of the survey focus, questions posed, 
inclusion/exclusion of those surveyed, and survey outcomes. EC 1997 repeatedly 
used the term “citizens” – in a document of 121 pages, citizen was used 303 times – 
though a shift towards consumerism was already embedded in the questionnaire. 
Concern about consumer satisfaction was consolidated in EC 2000a, 2002a and 
2003a. Interestingly, the most recent surveys show an interest about socio-economic 
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categories and a renewed attention to “non-consumers” is apparent, this despite the 
fact that EC 2007a contains 144 pages and uses “citizen” thirteen times and 
“consumer” 363 times. EC 2007a reveals few explicit policy objectives, however, 
such as what level of inaccessibility and unaffordability is acceptable in Europe. As a 
conclusion, EC 2005a and 2007a are still fundamentally concentrated on the 
consumer. 
 
4. Discussion 
 
Shifting public and private involvement in public service provision has long been a 
feature of societies. It is argued here that EU policy on public services started as a 
“blind eye” one from 1957 to the late 1970s, but then became “activated”. This latter 
phase was characterized by liberalization, deregulation, privatization and unbundling 
of many public service providers. Particularly from the 1990s, there has been a 
gradual “commodification” of public services through the stressing of consumer 
satisfaction, over and above citizen satisfaction. This trend has been revealed 
through the evolution of surveys on satisfaction with public services.  
  
The horizontal surveys on SGI also reinforce this trend. The three latest reports 
published in EC 2004b, 2005b and 2007b show a gradual, but unquestionable shift 
to market driven and structural reforms of network industries providing SGI more 
than a concern to implement regulation based on citizen voice. The latest report 
stresses above all the issues of market policy, market structure and competition, 
prices and competitiveness, and the effects of market opening. The final two parts of 
the seven-part report deal with public service obligations and consumer views. The 
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term “citizen” is not even used. When citing consumer views, an upbeat perspective 
is adopted whereby the public service reform has been an unconditional success.5 
From a policy perspective, the cure to improve network industry performance is 
more market. If consumers do not benefit from market reforms it is not because of 
any lack of enforced regulation, but rather, because competition is restricted by 
Member States, incumbents firms, technical, legal and other barriers, and even 
“consumer inertia”.6 What is needed, it is claimed, is more liberalisation, and further 
removal of barriers to new entrants. Market-orientated reform will cure EU sclerosis 
and, at the same time, increase “consumer satisfaction”. Even though the creation of 
EU Transnational Corporations in these sectors in a monopolistic competitive market 
could block market integration, the EC is largely unwilling or unable to challenge this 
process.7 In the energy sector, Helm (2007) has argued there is a “new energy 
paradigm” whereby governments are focusing on security of supply and climate 
change, rather than full liberalization of markets. 
 
What of the future? If, in the middle of the 1990s, it looked possible that a Directive 
on SGI could be passed that focused squarely on citizens´ rights, in 2008, it seems 
that the EU is quietly, and gradually, abandoning the aim of protecting citizens 
through supranational “positive integration” (Tinbergen, 1954), downloading this to 
the national level, or else promoting discussion with “soft” instruments or in non-
committal ways. For instance, it has been argued that, whilst the latest satisfaction 
surveys pay a renewed attention to socio-economic variables previously ignored, 
connecting these to questions of access and affordability, no clear policy targets are 
identified in terms of what levels of satisfaction with access and affordability are 
acceptable. The lack of policy proposals and targets contrasts sharply with the clarity 
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and confidence of policy statements in the recent horizontal evaluations on SGI 
performance.  
 
SGI was finally included in Treaty of Lisbon (in a Protocol) with a legal basis for the 
first time, where it is recognised that the provisions of the treaty do not affect nation 
State’s competences to organise and provide SGI (EC 2007b). This inclusion could 
make the possibility of approving a Charter for SGI more likely. However, this 
requires political will. Interestingly, there are ongoing proposals to approve a Charter 
on the Rights of Energy Consumers (EC, 2007d). This charter, which will not 
constitute a legal document, mainly focuses on problems consumers may have 
when the market does not work (difficulties in switching provider, lack of choice, 
intelligibility of the utility bill and so on). There is only residual attention to ensuring 
all citizens have a right to public services. The division of sectors into mini-Charters 
must be viewed with caution: it may signal the beginning, or the end, of the debate 
on consumerism, at the expense of citizen rights. 
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1  OFTEL was established in the UK in 1984, the Autorité de Régulation des 
Télécommunications in France in 1997, the Regulierungsbehörde in Germany in 1998, and 
the Autorità per le garanzie nelle comunicazioni in Italy in 1998. 
 
2 Interview with Dr. Francisco Caballero Sanz, Head of Unit, Economic Analysis and 
Evaluation, DG Internal Market, 18 February 2005. 
 
3 Correspondence on 23rd February 2005 with Dr Francisco Caballero Sanz, Head of Unit, 
Economic Analysis and Evaluation, DG Internal Market. 
 
4 Unfortunately, because the questionnaire provided three possible answers (good, bad or 
neither good nor bad) for respondents, it is difficult to compare these results with the following 
polls (where those surveyed were offered four possible options).  
 
5 “Consumers benefit as market opening leads to better performing network industries. The 
performance of network industries, such as telecommunications, transport and utilities has 
continued to improve and consumers are generally satisfied, according to a European 
Commission report. The opening up of these industries to competition has benefited users 
by putting pressure on service providers to keep their costs and prices down. Access to 
services at affordable prices for the less well off is also improving” (EC, 2007b). 
 
6 “In some Member States delays in market opening and in removing legal and technical 
barriers to new entrants have held performance back and competition is developing only 
slowly in postal services, the railways and the energy sector (EC, 2007b). 
 
7 “Other indicators of market integration relate to the intensity of M&A activity… one would 
expect two absolute effects in the M&A trends in the EU network industries.. firstly, ..an 
increase in networks M&A activity .. secondly, as result of reduced market barriers an 
increase in the share of EU cross border M&A” (EC, 2007b). 
 
